Draft Transitional (2 Year) Varroa Management Plan: Phase II of a three-phase varroa management plan

Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
PO Box 2526
Wellington

MAF Biosecurity Authority
MAF National Centre for Disease Investigation
MAF Policy

Contents

A Introduction

B Development Process

C Programme Components: Objectives, Preferred Option and Issues to Resolve

D Phase III Development Process

Appendices

Appendix 1. Options paper for North Island active surveillance

Appendix 2. Draft terms of reference for diagnostic laboratories participating in Phase II varroa surveillance

Appendix 3. Terms of reference for a mediation process between beekeepers affected by the movement control line

Appendix 4. Recommendations for movement control permitting conditions for Phase II (04/09/00)

Appendix 5. Options paper for South Island active surveillance

Appendix 6. Draft terms of reference for an analysis of the risks to non-target species associated with a feral bee poisoning programme

Appendix 7. Draft terms of reference for an assessment of the risk to public health associated with a feral bee poisoning programme

Appendix 8. Draft terms of reference for an analysis of the risks of varroa introduction into the South Island by non-beekeeper pathways (cut-flowers, logs, cars, freight, bumblebees)

Appendix 9. Draft terms of reference for development and approval of a standardised delivery method for formic acid solutions for the treatment of varroa

Appendix 10. Funding arrangements for North Island treatments

Appendix 11. Terms of reference for a varroa control booklet contract

Appendix 12. Draft terms of reference for the delivery of a programme of beekeeper workshops to develop skills for varroa management

Appendix 13. Terms of reference for the Varroa Management Group

A Introduction    

On 12 July 2000, the Cabinet agreed to a three-stage Government response to the incursion of Varroa destructor (varroa). The first stage of this response is already underway and progressing well. It involves immediate assisted treatment of infected hives with approved products at the Crown's expense, upon consent of the beekeeper.

Arrangements for the long-term management of varroa will be considered over the next two years using the framework for pest management provided by the Biosecurity Act 1993. A programme co-ordinator has been employed within MAF to facilitate the development of a national pest management strategy (NPMS) proposal in accordance with Part V of the Act. This may or may not result in a decision to proceed with a NPMS. Developing the NPMS proposal will involve extensive industry consultation, and if the industry indicates it does not require statutory powers to manage varroa long term, then a NPMS is probably not warranted. One advantage of a NPMS, however, is that it provides an opportunity to formalise sustainable industry funding arrangements.

For the period until long-term arrangements can be put in place, the Cabinet has agreed to support a two-year management programme to assist the transition into long-term control. The objectives of this programme are to ensure the South Island remains varroa free for as long as possible, and that impacts in the North Island are mitigated. The Cabinet has directed MAF to work with beekeepers and other interested industries to finalise an operational plan, and report back with a:

• recommended Government-supported transitional management programme;
• cost benefit analysis; and
• proposed implementation plan
.

MAF has discussed the development of the transitional two-year Government supported management programme at 14 regional meetings throughout the country. These meetings were convened by branches of the National Beekeepers' Association (NBA), and other interested industry groups were also in attendance. MAF has consolidated the feedback from these regional meetings.

This document contains a two-year management proposal intended to be finalised during a meeting in Wellington on 20 September 2000. Attendees at this meeting will include:

• a representative from each branch of the NBA;
• representatives from the NBA Executive;
• other interested industry stakeholders; and
• representatives from interested government departments.

Subsequent to this meeting, MAF will present the proposed two-year management plan to the Cabinet for its consideration. Final decisions on the programme will be subject to available resources and based on cost benefit analysis.

B Development of the Transitional Management Plan    

The development of the transitional (two year) varroa management plan will be undertaken by MAF in consultation with beekeepers and other affected stakeholders. The development process subsequent to the Cabinet decision on 12 July 2000 is described below.

1 MAF scoping document produced

• Identification of phase II components
• Objectives within each component
• Key issues within each component

2 Regional meetings with stakeholders (14-24 August 2000)

• Confirmation of stakeholders' preferences

3 North Island movement control mediation process (14-15 September 2000)

• Meeting of North Island commercial beekeepers potentially affected by the movement control boundary

4 MAF draft plan developed

• Confirmation of objectives
• Preferred option stated
• Initial assessment of costs (from draft Operational plan for control of varroa)
• Draft terms of reference developed for programme components
• Identify process for contracting suppliers
• Identify potential suppliers on the basis of technical skills and quality assurance capability

5 Wellington meeting of stakeholder representatives (20 September 2000)

• Presentation of detailed draft plan
• Confirmation of draft plan

6 Release terms of reference for programme components to potential suppliers, and request tenders

7 Report to Cabinet (mid-October)

8 Contracts for delivery of management plan programme components developed and agreed with suppliers

C Programme Components: Objectives, Preferred Option, Issues to Resolve and Indicative Costs     

1 North Island

1.1 Surveillance

1.1.1 Objectives

Primary objective

Mechanisms to achieve objective

• Active and passive surveillance programmes developed to monitor spread.
• Information distribution networks established to ensure results of surveillance are rapidly conveyed to industry, in particular the occurrence of varroa in a new region. Encouragement for development of local networks for self-monitoring and information sharing on varroa occurrence and levels of infestation in all regions.
• far as possible, varroa surveillance coordinated with surveillance for exotic bee diseases and American foulbrood.

1.1.2 Preferred option

• Education of beekeepers regarding surveillance methods such as the use of sticky boards or screened bottom boards, including dissemination of information on how to make such products.
• Clear mechanisms for beekeepers to report suspicion of positive findings to the active surveillance contractor to allow confirmatory testing and monitoring of spread.
• NBA Branches foster networks for ongoing monitoring once varroa established in a region, through self-monitoring and reporting. Privacy issues will dictate that such information sharing is voluntary, so beekeepers will need to be educated with respect to the benefits of such a system.
• Reinforcement of the reasons for passive surveillance, the methods and tools during the formal extension programmes and during active surveillance exercises.

(Note: A discussion and analysis of North Island active surveillance strategies developed by MAF National Centre for Disease Investigation appears as Appendix 1)

• Apistan(r) and sticky board established as standardised inspection method for active surveillance, with accurate definition of test sensitivity for early infestations through research.
• Surveillance will aim to achieve testing of 4 randomly selected apiaries per 20 x 20 km grid in all North Island areas where apiaries occur and which are not previously known to be infested with varroa. This will provide 95% confidence of detecting a 48% intra-grid prevalence. The total number of apiaries to test in the North Island will be 991, based on data from the apiary database and known distribution on 27 July 2000. All hives at an apiary site will be tested, capped at 20 hives. The total hives to test will be 13,874 (assuming an average 14 hives per apiary).
• Active surveillance programme begins in Autumn 2001. The aim will be to achieve the desired sample size by the completion of the transitional management plan in two years time.
• A surveillance contract will be developed for field surveillance operations with Government meeting full costs of active surveillance to monitor spread into new regions. MAF considers that AgriQuality New Zealand has demonstrated its capability to deliver work of this nature through servicing existing MAF contracts for apiculture exotic disease surveillance and apiculture exotic disease response. The first 12 month contract for North Island field surveillance activities will be offered by restricted tender to MAF's established contractor for apiculture surveillance, AgriQuality New Zealand Ltd. Competition may be introduced for the second 12 month contract if other potential contractors with appropriate technical skills and quality assurance capability are identified during the first year.
• Delivery of surveillance includes an element of extension, utilising beekeepers in training exercises to conduct sampling.
• Contracts for diagnostic laboratory services for active surveillance offered to those diagnostic laboratories presently operating surveillance contracts with MAF which are identified to have appropriate entomological expertise. Terms of reference for diagnostic laboratories produced and released by way of closed tender. (See Appendix 2.)
• The Varroa Management Group (see section 6 Administration) is accountable for contracts for field and laboratory surveillance services.
• Fully transparent systems for reporting results of active and/or passive surveillance, with rapid publication on the MAF and NBA websites and through other media such as the New Zealand Beekeeper.

1.1.3 Unresolved issues

• Surveillance is a reasonably expensive activity. Given the inevitability of eventual North Island spread, would this money be better spent on research and/or extension services?
• Industry agreement for the design of an active surveillance plan, in particular the sample size and sampling strategy. The design will be to detect clusters of infected apiaries rather than individual infected apiaries. In effect, this will mean detection at about one-year after spread-event resulting from the incursion, and therefore there will be some high level infested apiaries in the centre of clusters. This will need to be balanced against beekeeper expectations of early warning systems. The plan that offers the greatest likelihood of early detection will be the most expensive one.

1.1.4 Indicative cost

• The preferred option presented above involves testing 991 apiaries. AgriQuality New Zealand Ltd has provided an estimate of surveillance costs in a routine programme (i.e. as opposed to an emergency response de-limiting survey) of approximately $238,740 (GST exclusive) per 1000 apiaries.
• Development of surveillance reporting mechanisms will be managed by MAF and NBA utilising existing services such as websites, publications and electronic mailing lists, and through media releases. The associated cost is unlikely to be significant.

1.2 Movement controls

1.2.1 Objectives

1.2.2 Preferred option

• Instigate an industry-led mediation process to determine the positioning of the movement control line between upper and lower North Island, and to address the consequences of the positioning of the line for affected beekeepers. (See Appendix 3).
• Adopt a reviewed movement permitting policy that allows all movements within the upper North Island (See discussion of these issues in the paper at Appendix 4).
• Review the Controlled Area notice in light of any recommendation to re-define the movement control line separating the upper and lower North Island resulting from the mediation process. Changes to the movement permitting policy will also be agreed at that time. Controlled Area notice and conditions for movement will be gazetted if changes apply. They will remain in force at least until varroa is recorded south of the movement control line separating upper and lower North Island. Once the decision is made to remove movement control restrictions within the North Island, there would need to be a further review of the Controlled Area notice retain the North Island to South Island movement restrictions.
• The Varroa Management Group (see section 6 Administration) establishes a process for all further reviews to Controlled Area notices, movement control restrictions, and movement permitting policy that are considered necessary. The process may involve:
• regular reviews at certain times of year or on as-issues-arise basis
• a small technical team (including nominated beekeeper representatives) to consider issues and make recommendations
• MAF review of recommendation, including assessment of compensation liability, and
• implementation of an agreed consultation process with beekeepers.
• Administration of the movement permitting process managed as a component of the field surveillance contract. Administrative costs for movement permitting will need to be funded by MAF, as the Biosecurity Act does not provide for cost-recovery for a movement permitting function within a Controlled Area.
• Reports of breeches of the Controlled Area Notice will be investigated by MAF Enforcement Unit and prosecutions pursued.

1.2.3 Unresolved issues

• There is a huge variation in regional views regarding movement controls, and finding an outcome that satisfies all views will probably not be possible. For instance, there is a desire from some upper North Island branches to restrict movements of potentially infected hives within the Infected Zone. Many branches expressed a desire to use prophylactic treatment during pollination in the Infected Zone. MAF considers that the small benefit that could be achieved by these measures does not outweigh the technical and logistical considerations against them.
• There is an expectation from some beekeepers and other stakeholders that MAF actively enforce the movement control line, conduct high level surveillance south of the line, and prepare for a response to a finding of varroa south of the line. MAF's view is that this is unrealistic, that spread across the whole of the North Island is inevitable given the current distribution, and that the only appropriate medium-to-long term movement control line is the Cook Strait.
• Compensation liability will need assessed for the following situations:
• for beekeepers whose business operations straddle the movement control line,
• for upper North Island beekeepers prevented from moving to honey sites south of the movement control boundary, (if mediation fails to resolve these two issues), and
• for upper North Island beekeepers previously engaged in sale of queens to southern North Island and South Island beekeepers.
• Risk analysis and risk management recommendations for movement of package queens from upper to lower North Island may be necessary.

1.2.4 Indicative costs

• Costs for administration of the movement permits policy estimated at $10,000 based upon the current recommendation for movement permitting policy which allows free movement in the upper North Island. The administration of the movement permitting policy could be incorporated into the field surveillance contract.
• Compensation liability resulting from movement controls has not yet been assessed.

2 South Island

2.1 Surveillance

2.1.1 Objectives

• Conduct surveillance to verify that the South Island is free from varroa and to provide early detection of the presence of varroa in order to maximise the likelihood of a successful response.

• Implement an active surveillance plan that combines purposive (risk-based) sampling from areas considered a high risk on the basis of likelihood of both incursion and subsequent spread, with random sampling from other areas.

2.1.2 Preferred option

(Note: A discussion and analysis of North Island active surveillance strategies developed by MAF National Centre for Disease Investigation appears as Appendix 4)

• Apistan(r) and sticky board established as standardised inspection method for active surveillance, with accurate definition of test sensitivity for early infestations through research.
• A 20 x 20 km grid area has been taken as the sampling unit for cluster level detection. The intra-cluster prevalence of the Hauraki Plains cluster (48%) is taken as the detection limit. In effect, what is proposed is surveillance to detect a cluster with intra-cluster prevalence of 48% in any 20 x 20 km area of the South Island where apiaries occur. At least 7 apiaries per 20 x 20 km grid must be tested to provide 99% confidence in detecting a cluster with intra-cluster prevalence of 48%.
• The confidence limit of 99% is considered appropriate in order to provide a very high probability of detecting an incursion at a stage that maximises the probability of successful eradication. Testing 7 apiaries per 20 x 20 km grid will also mean that there are fewer apiaries to be tested during an incursion response delimiting survey.
• Assumptions can be made as to which 20 x 20 km areas where apiaries occur are most likely to be infected first if an incursion into the South Island occurred, by making assumptions as to the likely route of introduction (e.g. airports, container terminals, population centres). If 7 apiaries are tested for each 20 x 20 km area, a sample size of 703 apiaries selected from high risk grid areas will provide 99% confidence of detecting a cluster with 48% intra-cluster prevalence.
• A sample of 1028 apiaries randomly selected from the remaining grid areas of the South Island where apiaries are located but which are not classified as high risk will provide 90% confidence of detecting a cluster with 48% intra-cluster prevalence.
• An active surveillance combining both sampling methods would test 1731 apiaries (703 + 1028). The number of hives to be tested at each apiary site is 100%. Therefore, the number of hives to test will be 24,234 (assuming an average number of 14 hives per site).
• Active surveillance in the South Island should begin as soon as possible. A pre-planned exotic disease surveillance exercise in Canterbury to be held between 19-22 September 2000 will be used to achieve sampling to contribute to the first year of active surveillance. The intention will be to achieve testing of at least 1731 apiaries annually until varroa is detected in the South Island.
• A surveillance contract will be developed for field operations with Government meeting full costs of active surveillance in the South Island. MAF considers that AgriQuality New Zealand has demonstrated its capability to deliver work of this nature through servicing existing MAF contracts for apiculture exotic disease surveillance and apiculture exotic disease response. The first 12 month contract for South Island field surveillance activities will be offered by restricted tender to MAF's established contractor for apiculture surveillance, AgriQuality New Zealand Ltd. Competition may be introduced for the second 12 month contract if other potential contractors with appropriate technical skills and quality assurance capability are identified during the first year.
• Delivery of surveillance includes an element of extension, utilising beekeepers in training exercises to conduct sampling. These exercises would need to be timed so as to be coordinated with normal beekeeping activities.
• Contracts for diagnostic laboratory services for active surveillance offered to those diagnostic laboratories presently operating surveillance contracts with MAF which are identified to have appropriate entomological expertise. Terms of reference for diagnostic laboratories produced and released by way of closed tender. (See Appendix 2.)
• The Varroa Management Group (see section 6 Administration) is accountable for contracts for field and laboratory surveillance services.
• Fully transparent systems for reporting results of active and/or passive surveillance, with rapid publication on the MAF and NBA websites and through other media such as the New Zealand Beekeeper.
• Once varroa is detected in the South Island, the contract will cease and efforts will be re-directed to the incursion response de-limiting survey. If eradication is not attempted or fails, a new surveillance system for the South Island that monitors spread region by region would need to be established, potentially based upon the surveillance plan recommended for the North Island

2.1.3 Unresolved issues

• There is no agreed international standard for verification of a country or zones freedom from varroa. The International Committee of the OIE (1999) proposed that surveys should be designed to detect a prevalence not exceeding 0.2% with 99% confidence. However, demonstration of varroa freedom in the South Island in accordance with international standards is considered to be less important than early detection to support successful eradication. Evidence from the North Island suggests that the distribution of varroa is highly clustered. This requires that the size and intra-cluster prevalence (proportion of apiaries infected per unit area) of a cluster that is likely to be able to be successfully eradicated is determined. Surveillance would be designed to enable detection of such a cluster in the South Island. The benchmark used in this respect is the Hauraki Plains cluster, which represents a cluster of apiaries infested as a result of hive-crash from an index infected apiary. These issues must be understood and accepted by industry.

2.1.4 Indicative costs

• The preferred option presented above involves testing 1731 apiaries. AgriQuality New Zealand Ltd has provided an estimate of surveillance costs in a routine programme (i.e. as opposed to an emergency response de-limiting survey) of approximately $238,740 (GST exclusive) per 1000 apiaries. The annual cost of South Island surveillance would therefore be approximately $413,260 (GST exclusive)
• Development of surveillance reporting mechanisms will be managed by MAF and NBA utilising existing services such as websites, publications and electronic mailing lists, and through media releases. The associated cost is unlikely to be significant.

2.2 Incursion response

2.2.1 Objectives

• Eradication of varroa from the South Island if technically feasible and benefits outweigh costs.

• Prepare contingency plans for rapid response to an incursion of varroa in the South Island.
• The objectives of the response should be as for other exotic disease responses, namely:
• prevent further spread through application of movement controls
• conduct a delimiting survey
• assess technical feasibility and cost of eradication
• implement the eradication contingency plan, if the decision is to do so.
• Clearly establish the benefits associated with maintaining South Island freedom from varroa, to facilitate a cost-benefit approach to decision-making in the event of an incursion.

2.2.2 Preferred option

• MAF Policy completes the economic analysis of the benefits of maintaining South Island as free from varroa, and this work is incorporated into recommendations made to Cabinet.
• An agreement is reached with MAF's contracted exotic disease response supplier (i.e. AgriQuality New Zealand Ltd) to the effect that existing response systems will be utilised in the event of an incursion of varroa into the South Island.
• A decision making process for the incursion response is established by the Varroa Management Group (see section 6 Administration). The process would involve technical feasibility assessment and cost-benefit analysis. The accountabilities of other government departments, and the needs of stakeholders not represented on the Varroa Management Group, will need to be taken into account by the process.
• MAF, Department of Conservation, Ministry of Health and Regional Councils develop memoranda of understanding to determine how conservation, public health and resource management issues would be addressed for feral bee poisoning programme in the South Island. This is likely to require a non-target species risk analysis and an environmental and public health risk assessment. The Varroa Management Group will need to ensure this work is commissioned and undertaken to the satisfaction of the accountable government departments. Terms of reference for these contracts will be required (see Appendices 6 and 7).
• The Varroa Management Group would need to identify South Island stakeholders and prepare a contingency arrangement for a consultative forum of stakeholders to consider technical issues on appropriate response to an incursions based upon findings of delimiting surveys i.e. technical and logistical feasibility of eradication.
• Contingency funding for incursion response, in particular the de-limiting survey, must be established. Cabinet would be requested to consider a specific appropriation to attempt eradication, on the basis of technical feasibility assessment establishing a high probability of success and an analysis demonstrating that costs outweigh benefits.
• Managed and feral colony depopulation methods investigated through trials prior to any incursion event (see section 5 Research). Recommended chemicals for use in each situation must go through the MAF Agricultural Compounds and Veterinary Medicines approval process for an experimental use permit.
• The Varroa Management Group would have to agree on contingency eradication attempt actions, which would be based upon the draft operational plan for eradication of varroa. This process may involve further consultation with South Island beekeepers.

2.2.3 Unresolved issues

• Establish contractual arrangements for response to varroa incursion in the South Island.
• Decision-making process for eradication.
• Industry acceptance of the types of actions proposed in the draft Operational plan for eradication of varroa for an incursion response in the South Island i.e. delimiting survey, movement tracing; depopulation of managed colonies; feral bee poisoning by bait stations; movement controls; follow-up surveillance.
• Conservation, public health and resource management issues associated with feral poisoning programme.

2.2.4 Indicative costs

• Estimate of the costs of analysis (assuming consultants would be utilised) and consultation required prior to an incursion: approximately $50,000.
• The draft control options plan estimated the cost of a response to eradicate a South Island incursion, based upon the draft operational plan for eradication, to be $6 - 6.5M.
• Based upon overseas evidence, there is a reasonable probability of an incursion within 5 years.

2.3 Movement control

2.3.1 Objectives

• Minimise the risk of transfer of varroa to the South Island. Ensure the South Island remains free of varroa for as long as realistically possible

• Maintain movement controls on risk goods (beekeeper pathways such as hives, queens, unprocessed products and used equipment), and educate beekeepers about these controls.
• Raise the profile of the movement controls at North Island exit ports through poster campaigns to prevent accidental transfer in cargo or cars.
• Consider the risks associated with beekeeper and non-beekeeper pathways, and implement measures commensurate with the risk.

2.3.2 Preferred option

• Adopt a reviewed movement permitting policy, following consultation with NBA and beekeepers. (See Appendix 4). Ensure all beekeepers are notified of movement permitting policies.
• Varroa Management Group commissions a risk analysis examining the pathways for a South Island incursion of varroa, and makes risk management recommendations. Terms of reference for this risk analysis will be required (see Appendix 8).
• Identify pathways for potential transfer of risk goods and notify all operators (transport operators, post offices, cut-flower organisations) of movement control conditions.
• Poster campaign implemented at inter-island transport terminals.
• Controlled Area notice and movement controls remain in force until varroa recorded in the South Island and eradication attempt either fails or is decided against.
• Varroa Management Group develops a process for considering all reviews to movement control/permitting policy.
• review considered in conjunction with decision-making process on incursion response
• technical team (including nominated beekeeper representatives) consider issues and make recommendations
• MAF review of recommendation, including assessment of compensation liability to arise
• agreed consultation process.
• Administration of the movement permits process (if movement permits for specific goods are to be issued in accordance with agreed risk management measures) incorporated into the field surveillance contract. Administrative costs for movement permitting will need to be funded by MAF, as the Biosecurity Act does not provide for cost-recovery for a movement permitting function within a Controlled Area.
• Reports of breeches of the Controlled Area Notice will be investigated by MAF Enforcement Unit and prosecutions pursued.
• All South Island beekeepers encouraged to keep a record of hive movements to assist tracing in the event of an incursion response. This could be reinforced during extension programmes.

2.3.3 Unresolved issues

• Risk analysis and agreed levels of risk management for particular pathways e.g queens.

2.3.4 Indicative costs

• Estimate of cost for risk analysis work: $20,000
• Costs of education and signage from draft control options paper: $12,000
• Depending on risk management decisions, there may be administrative costs associated with movement permitting.

3 Treatments

3.1 Objectives

Primary objectives

• Beekeepers take responsibility for decisions on treatment of their apiaries to maintain hive health and productivity, in accordance with an industry-wide strategy based upon integrated pest management principles.
• A choice of treatment products with established efficacy and safety made available, including organic treatments.

• Commercial distribution networks established for products that have received ministerial approval.
• Development of an industry-wide strategy based upon integrated pest management principles that minimise problems associated with rapid re-infestation, chemical resistance in mites and chemical residues in hive products and enables organic producers to continue their business.
• Education and encouragement of beekeepers for treatment in accordance with the industry-wide strategy.
• Treatment products from at least two families of compounds approved for use in hives by the Minister following assessment of efficacy, safety and residue issues by MAF ACVM, with appropriate recommendations for use. At least two treatments suitable for organic certification also approved to provide choice for organic beekeepers.

3.2 Preferred option

• The Varroa Management Group monitors and, where necessary, assists the process of approving treatment products in order to provide the range of treatments considered necessary within the treatment strategy. This may involve identifying commercial interests to progress treatment products from at least two chemical families and for formic acid and thymol products in specific formulations. If necessary, encouragement or incentives offered to progress these products through the MAF ACVM fast-track approval processes.

(N.B. One synthetic pyrethroid is already approved and another is in the approval process. A further product from a separate chemical family is also already in the approval process. The distributor of a thymol product has indicated intention to progress through the approval process.)

• Commercial distributors of treatment products establish contractual arrangements with overseas treatment manufacturers/distributors. No Government or Treatment Management Body intervention in these processes.
• Beekeepers make their own management decisions on when and how to treat and which treatment products to use. Beekeepers purchase treatments from commercial suppliers.
• Education and encouragement of beekeepers to follow the industry-wide treatment strategy, but no enforcement.
• The Varroa Management Group commissions a consultant to develop an industry-agreed standardised delivery mechanism (or mechanisms) for formic acid solutions as a low-cost varroa treatment alternative. The project will include obtaining the necessary information to seek approval for this mechanism through MAF ACVM processes. Terms of reference will be required for this work (see appendix 9).
• The Varroa Management Group works with MAF Food Assurance Authority to review the New Zealand honey and bee product residue monitoring programme to meet public health and market access requirements.
• No government financial subsidisation of treatment products. (A discussion of the reasoning behind this decision appears as Appendix 10.)

3.3 Unresolved issues

• Efficacy, safety and residues data for formic acid solutions sufficient to support an application for approval may not be readily available. This may require some original research.

3.4 Indicative costs

• The Varroa Treatment Management Body may require funding for encouragement of applications for approvals of treatment products. Estimate of costs: $20,000.
• Estimate for the contract for developing and approving a standardised delivery method for formic acid solutions: $20,000 (assuming no original research required).

4 Extension services

4.1 Objectives

• Develop recommendations for management of varroa by individual beekeepers using an integrated pest management approach, involving regular monitoring, treatment upon reaching established thresholds, minimal use of chemicals, rotation of treatment product families, and avoidance of residues and resistance. Recommendations based upon overseas experience and beekeeper consultation.

• Provide a written resource outlining these recommendations for all beekeepers to refer to that provides relevant information on technical and regulatory issues related to varroa management.
• Provide a programme of workshops for beekeepers to learn the skills associated with varroa management.
• Provide encouragement for the establishment of regional networks for ongoing sharing of experiences related to varroa management.
• Utilise active surveillance programmes to provide extension by conducting surveillance through beekeeper training exercises.

4.2 Preferred option

• Process of literature review and expert consultation to develop an industry wide treatment strategy that best fits beekeeping practice in New Zealand. Research into varroa population dynamics and control methods used to periodically review treatment strategy. This process integrated into development of written reference material, specifically the Varroa Control Booklet.
• Contract for writing, printing and distribution of a Varroa control booklet developed. Terms of reference for this contract appear as appendix 11.
• Contract for delivery of a programme of varroa control courses developed and programmed in accordance with the needs of beekeepers in different regions based upon distribution and spread of varroa. Terms of reference for this contract in appendix 12.
• Suppliers of extension services must demonstrate appropriate extension skills and quality assurance capabilities.
• Series of articles on varroa management commissioned for the New Zealand Beekeeper and horticultural industry journals from New Zealand and overseas experts.

4.3 Issues

• The treatment strategy should probably avoid selective endorsement of proprietary registered products , but provide good practical advice on use of all products. Endorsement within the strategy would favour particular New Zealand distributors and overseas manufacturers.

4.4 Indicative costs

• Draft plan noted costs of $428,410 for such an extension programme covering all these elements, spread over 7 years.

5 Research

5.1 Objectives

• Identify and prioritise research needs in order to undertake only relevant research.

• Receive advice from an industry-led research advisory committee.
• Implement a system for competitive tendering that is open and transparent, with allocation of funds for approved projects and appropriate on-going monitoring.
• Integrate findings of research into extension service to ensure appropriate technology transfer mechanisms for results of research to industry.

5.2 Preferred option

• A specific fund for varroa research should be established, with the Varroa Management Group responsible for administering these funds.
• The NBA Apiculture Research Advisory Committee makes recommendations to the Varroa Management Group regarding research needs and priorities.
• The Varroa Management Group is responsible for approving, prioritising, commissioning, and managing research into varroa. Where appropriate, the processes for managing operational research through competitive tendering that are administered by MAF and other government research funders should be followed. The Varroa Management Group will ensure that the results of research are integrated into extension materials and published in appropriate industry and scientific journals.

5.3 Issues

• A range of agencies may be interested in conducting research, requiring a system of competitive tendering for proposals. Tendering must be very carefully managed.

5.4 Indicative costs

The draft control plan suggested a research fund of $1.4M. MAF's experience to date suggests this sum would purchase between 15-25 pieces of original research of varying size.

6 Administration

6.1 Objectives

• Management of the transitional management plan coordinated by MAF in accordance with public policy processes, in consultation with stakeholders.
• MAF retains accountability to government for public funds invested in varroa management programmes.

• Formation of a body led by MAF with industry participation to oversee all aspects of the transitional management plan.
• Specific programme components developed into projects with terms of reference ready tender by private contractors. The choice of tendering process will be driven by the range of potential supplier organisations identified. Potential supplier organisations must have appropriate technical skills and quality assurance capability.

6.2 Preferred option

• A Varroa Management Group is established. The Chairman will be the Director of Animal Biosecurity. The Secretary will be Programme Coordinator - Varroa. Members will be appointed to the Varroa Management Group from the NBA Executive, and from industry stakeholder groups such as the horticultural industry and/or Federated Farmers. Members that are not government officials should be paid an honorarium.
• The role of the Varroa Management Group will be clearly defined in terms of reference (see appendix 12), but will essentially be to provide overall coordination of the components of the varroa management plan. This will include:
• Oversight of regulatory issues associated with treatment approvals through MAF ACVM processes
• Contract management for all varroa-related contracts
• Managing varroa related research
• All contract management undertaken in accordance with processes established by MAF Biosecurity Authority.
• Opportunity shall be provided for identification of organisations to be considered for Phase II contracts. Organisations must demonstrate appropriate technical skills and quality assurance capability prior to being offered opportunity to tender for contracts. Where the Varroa Management Group considers there are a limited number of organisations with skills appropriate to the contract, the process shall be one of closed or restricted tender.
• Provision is made for technical advice and assistance to the NBA for managing the beekeeping industry's transition into long-term varroa control.

6.3 Issues

• The Varroa Management Group will need to establish a sustainable consultation mechanism for decisions where stakeholder consultation is recommended, such as movement controls.
• Identification, evaluation and appointment of appropriate contractors for phase II contracts. Contract management during Phase II programmes will require considerable input to ensure appropriate accountability.

6.4 Indicative costs

• Honarariums and disbursements associated with the Varroa Management Group, assuming quarterly meetings, are estimate as $60,000 per annum.
• NBA transition costs of $20,000 per annum.

7 Summary of indicative costs

N.B. These figures are derived from the indicative cost section of each programme component, with rounding of figures upwards.

First year costs: $1,659,630

Second year costs: $1,557,630

Combined costs of two-year programme: $3,217,260

• Potential one-off cost associated with South Island incursion. Not included into total for first or second year costs.

N.B. All figures are GST exclusive.

D Phase III Development Process     

• Development of a long-term management programme based upon integrated pest management.
• Pest management strategy development process established by the Biosecurity Act Part V.
• Smooth transition between Phase II and Phase III.
• Any varroa PMS must provide a coordinated interface with the existing AFB PMS.
• Led by MAF Biosecurity Programme Coordinator - Varroa, with appropriate coordination with NBA, other industries, government departments etc.

Options for long term management will be considered over the next two years.

Appendix 1. Options paper for North Island active surveillance

Introduction

The aim of this paper was to monitor the spread of varroa through the North Island of New Zealand. The objective was to detect 95% of clusters of varroa infestation at the time of sampling 1 year after spread occurred from an index site in an area. The reason for the monitoring programme is to alert beekeepers of the spread of varroa to the proximity of their sites, before significant losses occur.

Methods

A grid sampling scheme was used to design an active surveillance programme for varroa mite spread detection through the currently uninfested parts of the North Island. A range of options was assessed placing a 10 x 10 km grid and a 20 x 20 km grid over the North Island.

The confidence of detecting varroa in a grid containing a cluster was calculated at a range of different intra-grid prevalences. A cluster of disease is defined as an apparent prevalence in excess of 33% of apiaries per grid.

Cluster definition

The appropriate intra-grid prevalence to use was assessed by examination of the Hauraki cluster. The Hauraki cluster is approximately equivalent to a cluster resulting from spread one year after establishment of the index case.

Grid units containing one or more infested apiaries (as defined by the Varroa Delimiting Survey at 27/7/00) were identified and flagged as an infected grid unit. The number of apiaries, tested apiaries and positive apiaries were collated for each infected grid unit. The expected number of infested apiaries (had all apiaries within a grid unit been tested) was calculated by dividing the number of test positive apiaries by the proportion of apiaries tested.

Using a real example of a cluster such as Hauraki provides somewhat of a "benchmark". This cluster yielded an intra-grid prevalence of 86% within a 10 x 10 km grid centred on the area, or 48% prevalence within a 20 x 20 km cell.

Confidence level

It was felt that a 95% confidence of detection was satisfactory within the context of the North Island surveillance programme, although for zonal freedom, the OIE recommends a 99% confidence.

The confidence calculation was based on the hypergeometric distribution, which defines the probability of getting a particular outcome when sampling without replacement, given random distribution of infested and non-infested sites within a finite population. The specific calculation used the probability of finding no positives out of a range of randomly tested sites within an infected grid. This was done for each grid cell, using actual geographic data extracted from the Apiary database. The results were then summarised. The confidence was then taken to be 1 minus the probability of not finding any positives, i.e. the probability of finding at least one positive.

Results

A total of 910 10 x 10 km grid units and 251 20 x 20 km grid units contained apiaries currently not infested. As of 27 June 2000, 50 infected grid units were present in the North Island. Of the infested grid units 21 were defined as clusters (apparent prevalence of infested apiaries in excess of 33%).

Tables are presented with a range of confidence levels and intra-grid prevalences to enable selection of the preferred option.

Table 1 shows confidence of detecting a cluster in a 10 x 10 km grid given various levels of test intensity and assuming various apparent prevalences. The Hauraki cluster was examined and found to have 86% intra grid prevalence in a 10 x 10 km grid.

Table 1. Confidence of detecting a cluster in a 10 x 10 km grid with different levels of testing and different apparent intra-grid prevalences.

Table 2 shows confidence of detecting a cluster in a 20 x 20 km grid given various levels of test intensity and assuming various apparent prevalences. The Hauraki cluster was examined and found to have 48% intra grid prevalence in a 20 x 20 km grid.

Discussion

The use of a grid based testing program yields an even test density across the North Island. By collation of results this will provide the desired knowledge of regional freedom. The grid based approach was preferable to district or regional level samples as it reflects the unit of interest and will actually show the spread of disease geographically.

The size of the grid should reflect the size of a cluster of cases. The total number of sites to be tested will be affected by the grid cell size. The length of time a cluster of infection may have been present, given an approximate local spread rate of 5 km per year should be used to decide which grid cell size is most appropriate.

It was not necessary to examine issues of hive sensitivity or intra site prevalence as empirical (apparent) prevalence was used in the calculations. However, by increasing the site level sampling to all hives on site with a maximum of 20 hives per site, a better indication of spread will result.

The preferred option for the 10 x 10 km grid was to test 2 apiaries per grid. This requires the testing of 1710 apiaries and yields a 98% confidence of detecting a grid with a prevalence of 86%, the equivalent of the Hauraki cluster.

The preferred option for the 20 x 20 km grid was to test 4 apiaries per grid. This requires the testing of 991 apiaries and gives a 95% confidence of detecting a grid with a prevalence of 48%, the equivalent of the Hauraki cluster at a less precise level. The disadvantage of the larger grid is that the discovery of an infected apiary, would require more follow up work, hence more testing.

If it is desired to increase the testing intensity to detect clusters with a prevalence of 33%, then there is a need to increase the numbers of apiaries to test per cell (E.g. 7 apiaries per cell to detect infestation within a 20 x 20 km grid with 98% confidence). However, the aim to actively monitor spread with the objective to enable beekeepers to time treatment before significant losses occur would be possible with both previous options proposed, the difference being precision in the size of the area that will be deemed infected once varroa is found in a grid.

Appendix 2. Draft terms of reference for diagnostic laboratories participating in Phase II varroa surveillance

1 Objectives

To approve laboratories with appropriate technical skills and quality assurance capabilities to undertake diagnostic work resulting from field surveillance activities during Phase II of the varroa management plan.

2 Background

Up until the present time, the MAF National Plant Pest Reference Laboratory (NPPRL) has performed all diagnostic work for varroa, as is appropriate for surveillance for an exotic disease and during a response to an exotic disease incursion.

On 12 July 2000 Cabinet decided not to attempt eradication of varroa, and directed MAF to develop a three phase management plan to mitigate the impacts of varroa in New Zealand. NPPRL have continued to act as diagnostic laboratory for surveillance undertaken during Phase I of the management plan (delivery of immediate assisted treatement in the infected area, and testing on request at the margins of this area). MAF's intention is to introduce, where appropriate, competition into the delivery of all components during Phase II of the management plan. Phase II includes monitoring spread of varroa in the North Island, and surveillance in the South Island to provide an early warning of an incursion to maximise the probability of successful eradication.

In line with MAF policies of not providing services in competition to the private sector, the delivery of field and laboratory components of surveillance in the North and South Islands will be contracted to private sector agencies with appropriate technical skills and quality assurance capabilities.

3 Specifications

3.1 Laboratory personnel performing screening shall be trained to recognise Varroa destructor and other exotic bee mites. A scientist experienced in the diagnosis of exotic bee mites shall be on duty when the varroa screening laboratory is functioning.

3.2 The standard operating procedure for varroa screening shall be as provided in Appendix 1.

3.3 General requirements of approved laboratories will be as described in the relevant general chapters of the MAF Biosecurity Standard for Approved Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratories (available from MAF Biosecurity on request), specifically:

• Section 3. General Requirements
• Section 5. Organisation and Management
• Section 6. Quality System, Audit and Review
• Section 8. Accomodation and Environment
• Section 10. Referral tests
• Section 11. Records

3.4 Reporting requirements

3.4.1 Routine reporting of results

All results shall be reported to the submitter, who shall be a MAF approved supplier of field surveillance activities during the Phase II varroa management plan. The approved supplier of field surveillance activities shall be responsible for ensuring overall collation of results, and reporting of targets against MAF's specifications for surveillance.

3.4.2 Finding varroa outside known distribution in New Zealand

The distribution of varroa shall be monitored by the laboratory, in accordance with MAF's de-limiting survey information and new findings during Phase II surveillance. Any laboratory confirmation of varroa in an area not previously known as infected shall be immediately notified to MAF Biosecurity Authority (attention: Programme Co-ordinator, Varroa). MAF Biosecurity Authority may request confirmation of the result from NPPRL.

3.4.3 Quarterly report

The supplier shall provide quarterly reports to MAF Biosecurity Authority (attention: Programme Co-ordinator, Varroa) on the following:

• update on laboratory management structure, and changes in duties, departures of senior technical staff, and
• significant changes to the operating procedures, accommodation and equipment, and
• a list of senior technical personnel with relevant qualifications, and
• a summary of diagnostic work within the Phase II varroa management plan, including results, undertaken during the period

These shall cover the months of July to September, October to December, January to March, and April to June. They shall be submitted by 1 November (covering the months 1 July to 30 September) 1 February (covering the months 1 October to 31 December) 1 May (covering the months 1 January to 30 March) and 1 August (covering the months 1 April to 30 June) respectively.

Standard operating procedure for laboratory inspections of sticky boards for varroa

1. Transport of samples outside the infested zone

• Freeze samples for 24 hours.
• Double bag and seal samples.

2. Transport of samples within infested zone

• Double bag and seal samples.

1. Sticky board samples should be read within 2-3 working days of collection from hives (This will increase the readability of sticky board samples especially under wet weather condition).

2. All the sticky board samples should be examined under a X2 magnifying lamp (minimum 1.75 magnification).

3. Examine every mite specimen on the sticky board to determine whether it is varroa mite or not.

4. If mites suspected to be varroa are seen, these should be verified by examining under the binocular microscope.

5. Samples that are difficult to read under the magnifying lamp due to deposition of hive materials and/or fungal growth should be examined under the binocular microscope.

6. If requested by MAF Biosecurity Authority, positive varroa samples from outside known infested zone, should be submitted (with the Apiary Inspection Form) to a Reference Entomologist, NPPRL for verification within 1 working day.

7. On going training should be carried out to maintain the identification abilities of personnel screening samples.

8. Any suspect exotic disease of honeybees encountered during surveillance for varroa must be immediately notified to the Reference Entomologist, NPPRL, who shall provide instructions for submission to NPPRL for verification.

1. Samples should be sealed, sorted into storage boxes for easy retrieval of specific boards and placed in freezer within 3 working days after inspection, until permission is given for disposal.

1. Record all results on Apiary Inspection Form (EBD03).

2. Completed Apiary Inspection Forms should be duplicated and one should stay with the sample and the other form should be returned to the submitter.

3. Routine reporting of results to the submitter should include a daily summary result sheet is to be sent to the Incident Controller. This should include

• date
• total number of sticky board examined
• number of positive sites and details of each positive site (Beekeeper ID, MAF site number, total number of boards and number of varroa mite found on each board).
• details of samples sent to Reference Entomologist for verification (Beekeeper ID, MAF site number, grid reference and inspection district)

4. All new exotics to be reported within 30 minutes of detection.

Appendix 3. Terms of reference for a mediation process between beekeepers affected by the movement control line

1 Objective

Facilitate a mediation process with the following outcomes:

• Definition of the movement control boundary between the upper and lower North Island in accordance with the objectives of reducing spread of varroa while avoiding undue impacts from regulatory interventions and taking into account topography and density of apiary sites.
• Identification of potential solutions for beekeepers most affected by the movement control boundary agreed on. This could involve trade off between sites operated by beekeepers on either side of the line within contractual arrangements for return of sites once movement control is lifted.

2 Background

A detailed briefing paper developed by Helen Benard, MAF NCDI, is attached.

3 Specifications

3.1 Mediation must involve regional beekeeper representatives of Waikato, Bay of Plenty and lower North Island branches, the beekeepers most affected by movement controls between the current Buffer and Surveillance Zones, and the NBA executive.

3.2 The format for mediation is flexible. It may involve a meeting, conference calls, distribution of written materials, compilation of submissions or any other technique the facilitator considers appropriate. MAF requires a mediation plan to be presented for approval prior to the initiation of the mediation process.

3.3 MAF will finance all disbursements (travel of beekeepers to meeting, communication and correspondence costs) associated with the mediation process. However, MAF requires that approval is sought and obtained for costs prior to their being incurred, with an estimate of the cost likely to be incurred.

3.4 A written report detailing the full mediation process to be used and the outcomes of mediation, in particular addressing the objectives described above, must be developed and supplied to MAF.

3.5 The mediation process should be completed and the report submitted to MAF by Thursday 14 September 2000. However, this deadline should not be met at the expense of due attention to the concerns of all parties involved in the mediation process. If the deadline cannot be met, an interim report must be submitted on that date. The interim report must clearly state the process still to be completed and the likely date of completion.

3.6 A consensus outcome to mediation is desirable, but not absolutely necessary. If a clear consensus cannot be reached, the report should present recommendations that the facilitator considers address the majority of the concerns raised by participants in the mediation process.

3.7 Participants in the mediation process should be clearly informed that MAF will implement a consensus or majority recommendation, provided that:

• there is a sound technical basis for the recommendation
• the recommendation is considered to provide a workable medium term solution to movement control, in the view of MAF and other stakeholders such as the horticultural industry, and
• analysis determines the benefits of the movement control recommendation will outweigh the costs.

3.8 In the event that mediation results in neither a consensus nor majority recommendation, or that the three conditions at 3.7 are not considered to have been met by the recommendation provided, MAF reserves that right to instigate another process for determining the movement control boundary between the upper and lower North Island. The process may or may not involve consultation with stakeholders.

Issues relating to Control Area boundary redefinition, separating the upper and lower North Island

Summary of views on the Control Area boundary separating the upper and lower North Island.

The lower North Island NBA branches expressed the desire to rationalise the boundary between the upper and lower North Island.

The Wanganui Regional Branch meeting suggested to move the boundary around Taranaki and the Central Plateau north about 50 km to Mount Messenger then to Mount Ruapehu and continue with the existing line from there (see Figure 1). One reason behind this was that Taranaki beekeepers had their operations cut in half by the current boundary. By moving the boundary north to Mount Messenger, the boundary would be a better management (a natural boundary for most Taranaki operations) and topographical boundary. Another reason behind the request was that it would prevent movements of hives from affected areas into a clear area. The central plateau was considered a potential area for introduction of varroa into the lower North Island due to hives from the Bay of Plenty moving to honey sites on the central plateau.

This action would restrict access of upper North Island beekeepers to their honey sites. It was felt by the Wanganui meeting that, as they would possibly be eligible for compensation for loosing access to these honey sites through movement control restrictions and the reverse movements were not eligible for compensation, that it would be fairer to move the boundary to the North. A willingness to come to a contractual agreement for returning sites to upper North Island beekeepers when varroa had spread into the Surveillance Zone was expressed.

The Hamilton meeting considered that the boundary between the present Buffer Zone and Surveillance Zone should remain where it is, at least until further surveillance work is undertaken to understand the full extent of varroa's spread. Movements in the Infected and Buffer Zones should remain tightly controlled to reduce spread, with provision for compensation for affected beekeepers. All hives moved into pollination in the Infected and Buffer Zones should be subjected to prophylactic treatment.

The Auckland meeting considered that the current strict regime of movement control in the Infected and Buffer Zones should be maintained to reduce spread and preserve the option of future eradication. However, the meeting recognised that hive movements to pollination were necessary, and recommended that all hives moved to pollination be subjected to a prophylactic treatment using Apistan.

The Tauranga meeting did not want a movement control line (voluntary movement control only). The meeting did not define the movement control boundary between upper and lower North Island.

The Gisborne Regional Branch meeting suggested moving the boundary South to a more natural topographical and management boundary to Lotton Point to include Waikura Valley in the upper North Island Control Area. There was a strong desire that no Bay of Plenty pollination hives were to be moved into Poverty Bay The view was that not many beekeepers would be affected with only a small number of hives moving into the Poverty Bay area.

An obvious agreement was not reached and a mediation process was suggested to resolve the issues of boundary definition.

Figure 1: Proposed ( ) and existing Control Area boundaries between upper and lower North Island

Summary of Regional meeting outcomes as taken from the recorded notes at the meetings specific to upper and lower North Island movement control boundary.

Wanganui regional meeting

• Movement controls will be difficult to police completely. Not all bee movements (deliberate or accidental) will be stopped.
• Existing uncertainty about the current distribution of varroa is a complicating factor.
• The impact of controls on some commercial beekeepers is a serious concern.
• There is a strong case for moving the control boundary further north to assist with excluding bees moving in from affected/buffer areas. (A line between Mt Messenger and Mt Ruapehu is a natural boundary for most Taranaki operations)
• There is potential to consider a trade off between the income northern keepers retain from pollination versus the protection of southern keepers access to manuka areas.
• It will be necessary to design conditions to enable movement of beekeeping equipment versus bees.
• Consideration should be given to registration of sites to protect longer-term access for northern beekeepers in the event varroa spreads and movement controls are relaxed.

Recommendations

1. That movement control remains in force between the upper and lower parts of the North Island.

2. Move the movement control boundary to the north as discussed (i.e., Mt. Messenger - Mt. Ruapehu, then continue the existing line to the east.

3. Ensure negotiation between affected beekeepers to resolve issues around longer-term access to southern manuka and northern pollination contracts.

4. Compensation must be regarded as a central issue in finalising movement controls.

Gisborne regional meeting

• Move the movement control line south to include Waikura Valley in the buffer zone. Only two beekeepers come further than Hicks Bay. Generally, small numbers of hives and beekeepers involved (i.e. a few hundred hives). The top end of the line should terminate at the Lotton Point turn off after following the range between Waikura and Awatere. Straighten the line east of Motu to the pointed part of the existing line.
• The Crown must be prepared to exercise statutory powers if movement control breaches occur (i.e. strict enforcement)
• No Bay of Plenty pollination hives to be moved into Poverty Bay.
• Consider whether it is worth having a defined exclusion zone, taking into account the impact of feral hives. (main roads are high-risk areas). Signs should be erected on roadsides advising of the location of movement control.

Havelock North regional meeting

• Consider the protection of uninfected beekeeping 'enclaves' where these are identifiable and there are favourable geophysical characteristics.( i.e. special areas within control zones)
• The meeting was divided about the ability of northern beekeepers to move hives close to the surveillance zone. There was some support for an exclusion zone above the line for movement control permit purposes.
• Commercial beekeepers favour statutory movement controls while hobbyists favour voluntary controls.

Auckland regional meeting

No specific recommendations on CA boundary definition made.

Tauranga regional meeting

• Do not want a movement control line (voluntary only).
• Negotiation required between affected and non-affected beekeepers.
• Desire equity. Same opportunity for all beekeepers irrespective of infection status and geographic location
• Are agreeable to Federated Farmers mediated negotiation with respect to the movement control line.
• Movement to the surveillance zone should be allowed depending on hive treatment status, (treated for approximately 42 days prior to movement).

Hamilton regional meeting

No specific recommendations on CA boundary definition were made.

Whangarei regional meeting

The surveillance/ buffer zone boundary is not a major issue for the majority of Northland beekeepers, except for Queen breeders. No specific recommendations on CA boundary definition made.

South Island regional meetings (Nelson, Blenheim, Christchurch, Timaru, Alexandra, Gore, Balclutha)

No specific recommendations on CA boundary definition were made. South Island branches indicated the desire to keep in place a Surveillance Zone separating the upper and lower North Island to delay spread over the North Island and add to the protection of the South Island.

Additional submissions from Waikato and Bay of Plenty branches

Waikato branch submission

This meeting recommends that the boundaries remain where they are until further review work is carried out.

This meeting recommends that the surveillance line should be maintained as drawn and compensation be paid as a result of any losses incurred by the present movement control conditions.

Bay of Plenty branch submission

Like every other beekeeper, but urgently for the BOP beekeepers, we must now also maximise our returns to ensure each our businesses remain economically viable. We see that decisions taken now, with respect to 'Phase 2', can have either a significant negative or positive affect on many of our beekeepers. Now more than ever, they need their normal expected post pollination honey production opportunities.

Bay of Plenty Beekeepers moved at their Special Meeting, 24. August '00, preceding the Bay of Plenty Regional MAF meeting:

"That the spread of Varroa be controlled by Beekeeper Voluntary Co-operation and that a Branch Committee resolve the protocols to which Beekeepers will comply to protect the interest of all North Island Beekeepers" Carried Unanimously.

With respect to the objectives of control of varroa, the committee sees clearly number one objective 'to keep the SI free for as long as possible' as the most important one. Therefore expertise and money should be spent on where it is most effective. In this case that is Cook Straight.

The committee came up with three options for movement controls.

In order of preference:

No movement controls to be implemented on the NI, but concentrate on the natural barrier Cook Straight to keep the SI free for as long as possible. It was felt that movement controls other than this one will be very hard to police and costly. The SI would be better off with a concentrated effort that no mites make it across the Straight. This will be money very well spent.

Under this option it is proposed that the BioSecurity Act could allow prophylactic treatment in order to slow spread down. This in particular would apply for migratory beekeeping.

Option 2.

If there were to be any movement controls and a line drawn somewhere over the NI, that this be based on last year's migration of hives. The reasoning is that hives in particular from the Bay (Te Puke) can have spread mites, which means that the area in which these hives have been moved cannot be seen as mite free.

Based on this assumption, the line could be roughly starting on the East Coast: just south of Ruatoria in a line westwards till Mt Hikurangi, line to Rakaroa - Waikaremoana - Tarawera - Ashhurst and further just south of PN to Foxton.

The committee's understanding is that no hives coming from the Bay have gone beyond that line.

Also under this option it is proposed that the BioSecurity Act could allow prophylactic treatment in order to slow spread down.

This option is based on an historic reality.

Option 3.

Our least preferred option is based on the current surveillance line. The reality of this line is that it was drawn up too early during the initial surveying for the mite. Movements from the Bay were not taken into account because the line was drawn up before the Te Puke find. The committee's understanding is that this line does not represent any validated evidence of the southern side of it being mite free and therefore should not be adhered to.

However, if this line is adopted in principle IT MUST BE subjected to detailed negotiated change based on the following:

(a) The current surveillance line does not represent the best geographically suitable line. There are serious impacting flaws relating to the current "Districts" boundary line. This line must be made geographically practical.

(b) A significant number of beekeepers are severely economically impacted on by the current ad hoc 50km buffer zone at the surveillance line. There must be freedom of beehives movement up to the final chosen 'Phase 2' surveillance line, if any.

(c) With positive resolution of (a) and (b) there may still be some individual beekeeper livelihoods dramatically affected. Some beekeepers will need the right of each their cases negotiated, also with right of compensation for net income lost.

(d) Also under this option it is proposed that BioSecurity could allow prophylactic treatment in order to slow spread down. It is suggested that treatment be offered for all hives destined for the surveillance line.

Please note that we are currently canvassing each our affected beekeepers with respect to Option 3. We expect these responses to be available by August 11th.]

Appendix 4. Recommendations for movement control conditions    

1 Scope

The movement control policy presented is a substantial revision of the existing movement control conditions. Control zones and movement permitting conditions should be reviewed at the end of Phase II or once varroa is introduced to the lower North Island or South Island.

2 Objectives

The objectives of movement control in New Zealand are to:

1. Minimise the economic impact of varroa and associated regulatory controls for beekeepers in the North Island.
2. Ensure the South Island remains free of varroa for as long as possible.

Policies which will most effectively reduce the spread and therefore the economic impact of varroa may be in direct conflict with minimising the impact of regulatory controls. Conflicts of interest also exist between beekeepers in the upper North Island and those in lower North Island and South Island. It is recognised that most of the immediate negative impacts will be borne directly by beekeepers in the upper North Island. With regard to other stakeholders, industries which pay for pollination services would generally appear to benefit from more relaxed movement controls.

The competing demands were addressed by determining the emphasis of the objectives to be achieved within the different zones by industry consultation and justifying the movement restrictions on a technical basis. Emphasis has been placed on allowing beekeeping to continue as normal within all zones, as the effectiveness of the movement restrictions depend on the support of the beekeeping industry.

3 Method Of Accomplishing The Objectives

To accomplish movement control restrictions it is essential to define zones between which different levels of movement freedom exist. Once their boundary has been defined, keeping in mind the objectives listed above, permitting restrictions can be considered based on technical justification.

Movement Control Zones

There are three distinct areas in New Zealand as far as varroa status: the South Island, the lower North Island and the upper North Island.

• Varroa has been established in the upper half of the North Island, which has areas with high and low varroa densities. It would be extremely difficult to separate the upper North Island into different control zones, as there is no logical management or topographical justification for this.
• Varroa is not thought to be present in the lower half of the North Island This zone is at risk of varroa introduction due to its proximity to the upper North Island and past and possibly future (accidental or deliberate) hive movements from that area.
• There is no indication that varroa is present in the South Island or Stewart Island. They are well separated from the infested areas through natural boundaries and management practices.

A reclassification of currently existing Control Zones is proposed:

• The upper half of the North Island is classed as an Infected Zone.
• The lower half of the North Island is classed as a Buffer Zone.
• The South Island, Stewart Island and the Chatham Islands remain the Disease Free Zone.

The current Infected and Buffer Zones (declared on 29 April 00) within the upper North Island are amalgamated to one Infected Zone. As the Infected Zone is not separated from the lower North Island by a Buffer Zone, the previously-named Surveillance Zone is now classed as a Buffer Zone. As the North and South Island are sufficiently separated, there is no need to have a Surveillance Zone and the South Island is still classed as a Disease Free Zone.

The boundary between the upper and lower North Island would need to be defined taking into account the objectives of reducing spread of varroa while avoiding undue impacts from regulatory interventions and taking into account topography and density of apiary sites.

A mediation process was proposed by MAF for the beekeeping industry to redefine a boundary between the upper and lower North Island and find some solutions for beekeepers affected by the boundary.

Movement permitting conditions

The permitting conditions discussed in this paper assume the Control Area boundaries have been redefined and gazetted. It assumes a boundary between upper and lower North Island remains in place to more or less the same extent as before.

These movement control recommendations have been drafted taking into account objectives for movement control, technical grounds, industry views, integrated pest management practices, beekeeper education and long term workable statutory movement restrictions.

Statutory movement restrictions imply that enforcement will be used. Non-compliance with these movement restrictions will result in investigation by the MAF Enforcement Unit, followed by the appropriate actions (E.g. prosecution, destruction of risk goods).

The permitting conditions cater for beekeeper education in two ways. Firstly the permitting conditions aim to educate beekeepers about the risk that goods pose and the correct management of those risks. Secondly, the correct use of chemical treatments is promoted.

Movements within and from the defined Zones proposed are outlined below and given in detail in the following tables. Permit requirements for bee products are to be on a beekeeper/processor/business basis for a period of time (blanket permit) after education on risk management.

1. Movements within the Infected Zone

• All scheduled items: no permit required

2. Movements from the Infected Zone to the Buffer or Disease Free Zone

• Bee products, beekeeping equipment: permit required for most items, excluding new beekeeping equipment, honey in retail packs, processed wax, royal jelly and bee venom
• Live bees and brood: prohibited

3. Movements within the Buffer Zone

• All scheduled items: no permit required

4. Movements from the Buffer Zone to the Infected Zone

• All scheduled items: no permit required

5. Movements from the Buffer Zone to the Disease Free Zone

• Live bees and brood: prohibited

6. Movements within or from the Disease Free Zone

4 Recommended Changes to Movement Permitting Conditions

Significant changes from the previous movement control policy (iteration of 23 August) are:

1. The old Infected Zone and Buffer Zone are treated as a uniform area subject to the same movement control conditions.

2. All scheduled items within the Infected Zone can be moved without a permit.

3. Movements of bee products to the South Island are now subject to a permit on a beekeeper/processor/business basis for a period of time (blanket permits) after education on risk management.

5 Technical Justification

Table 1 lists the products and their associated risk ratings. Technical justification of allowing products to move must be based on this risk rating and the ability of this risk to be managed through permitting requirements. If the risk cannot be managed satisfactorily it concludes that the product may not be moved.

1. Movements within the Infected Zone

All scheduled items can move freely within the Infected Zone, as regulatory controls are though to have serious impact on beekeeping in the Infected Zone and the benefits of regulatory control are not likely to outweigh the impacts.

Infected Zone issues:

• Managed colonies detected as infected during the delimiting survey have had the opportunity for treatment during the Interim Assisted Control Programme. The same is true for apiaries thought to be potentially infected.
• All commercial beekeepers have taken up the opportunity for treatment.
• Large proportions of hobbyist beekeepers have not taken up the opportunity for treatment despite repeated encouragement to do so.
• Treatment is thought to reduce the mite numbers in the hive to low levels, but not completely free the colony of mites.
• Reinfestation of managed colonies can take place through introduction of mites from feral colonies and (untreated) managed colonies.
• Feral colonies are presumably infected in areas where natural spread has occurred.
• The delimiting survey results are not valid indefinitely as natural spread and intra-beekeeper spread has continued from these areas since the delimiting survey was conducted.
• Honey has been harvested from hives infected and hives potentially infected, increasing the level of intra-beekeeper (and possibly inter-beekeeper) spread despite permitting restrictions attempting to manage this risk.
• Movements of treated hives and tested negative hives have taken place, increasing the level of spread throughout the upper North Island.
• The spatial distribution of spread of varroa through the upper North Island is probably still limited.
• The levels of infestation are probably low, except for the larger clusters where feral and hobbyist colonies remain infested.
• Regulatory control of testing or treatment requirements prior to movements impact especially on commercial beekeepers' ability to manage their business.
• Regulatory controls impact on integrated pest management (IPM) strategies, because movements of infested hives could only be allowed after treatment has occurred, jeopardising the principles of IPM of treating only when necessary.
• Commercial colonies with low mite levels moving into or resident in pollination sites could create a low level of spread during this pollination season.
• Feral colonies resident in pollination area could create a low level of spread during this pollination season.
• Prophylactic treatment of hives moving into or resident in pollination sites could reduce the spread of varroa to a small degree.
• Prophylactic treatment of hives moving into or resident in pollination sites would promote the incorrect use of chemical treatments by treating when not strictly necessary, increasing the risk of the development of resistance to Fluvalinate.
• Prophylactic treatment of hives moving into or resident in pollination sites cannot be followed up by a similar procedure for hives moving into high-density honey sites, as incorrect label use of the chemical treatment would occur.
• Prophylactic treatment is in direct conflict with the principles of IPM.
• The limited short-term benefits of prophylactic treatment do not outweigh the short term and long term costs.

Regulatory control conclusions

Movement control impacts on beekeeping and the movement permitting conditions on the movements of live bees are inconsistent with IPM practices. The definition of the appropriate population to which permitting conditions should apply would become increasingly unmanageable and unfair over time.

Prophylactic treatment conclusions

A prophylactic treatment of hives starting 14 days prior to pollination and continuing throughout pollination according to label instructions was considered as a possible means of reducing spread at a time when many hives come together from the upper North Island. Even if a reduction in spread could be achieved by this method, it would still not imply that less Apistan would need to be used for treatment in the short to medium term.

There are several disadvantages to the use of prophylactic treatment in pollination sites. Currently infected feral colonies in high-density pollination areas may still be able to transfer infection to managed colonies on pollination sites. Furthermore, according to integrated pest management principles, the appropriate use of a chemical control method is to treat only when necessary and use only according to the manufacturer specifications. This practice is recommended for a good reason: to delay the development of resistance and reduce the likelihood of residues in honey and wax. Therefore the prophylactic treatment is not justifiable as if it were defensible this pollination season, why would it then not be defensible longer term? The use of Apistan for prophylactic treatment even for this pollination season would send out the wrong message to beekeepers.

2. Movements from the Infected Zone to the Buffer or Disease Free Zone

The risk of live bees transferring varroa can not be managed therefore movements are prohibited.

The risk of beekeeping equipment can be managed and therefore permitting of movements can be allowed. A special case is used frames. The risk of brood can possibly be managed by storage for a period of time and specifying the season in which the frames were last used. For the Disease Free Zone an additional requirement can be incorporated to have the frames inspected prior to departure to this zone.

The risk of bee products can be managed and therefore permitting of movements can be allowed. For crude wax, pollen and propolis a blanket permit can be issued on a beekeeper/processor/business basis for a period of time after education on risk management. This will give opportunity for education as well as enforcement.

3. Movements within the Buffer Zone

Varroa is deemed not to be present in the Buffer Zone, therefore no restrictions exist of movements within this zone on any items.

4. Movements from the Buffer Zone to the Disease Free Zone or Infected Zone

Although varroa has not been found to date in the Buffer Zone, there is still considerable risk of it entering into the Buffer Zone from the Infected Zone. As there is an increased risk of it being present, movements to the Disease Free Zone should be aligned with the movements proposed from the Infected Zone to the Disease Free Zone. Movements to the Infected Zone can be managed without restrictions, as the Buffer Zone is not thought to be infested with varroa.

5. Movements within or from the Disease Free Zone

No restrictions for movements within or from the Disease Free Zone are proposed as this zone has the highest probability of freedom of varroa.

6 Movement Permitting Conditions

The Movement Control Notice allows for an Inspector or Authorised Person under the Biosecurity Act 1993 to grant permission for items listed in the Schedule to be moved under certain conditions. They can authorise the movement of Scheduled items into, within, or from any part of the Controlled Area . This is formalised by way of a Movement Control Permit which may be issued by Apiculture Officers from Regional Offices or by the Movement Control Group based at the Varroa Treatment Programme Headquarters (0800 109 383).

The following tables outline movement permitting conditions, tabulated separately for (1) Infected Zone (upper North Island); (2) Buffer Zone (lower North Island); and (3) Disease Free Zone (South Island).

¹ To be permitted on a beekeeper/processor/business basis for a period of time (blanket permit) after education on risk management. Desirable to record the destination of the products to enable targeted surveillance of the Buffer and Disease Free Zones.

Definitions of risk management conditions

Screened: Bee proof mesh (e.g. insect screen on hives or shelter belt material over loads on trucks

Bee proof: Bees unable to gain access under normal circumstances

Bee free environment: Bees unable to gain access under normal circumstances

Sealed bee proof packaging: Plastic wrapped or sealed in wood, cardboard, plastic outer

Sealed container: Plastic wrapped or sealed in wood, cardboard, plastic outer

Crude wax: Wax scrapings or blocks of wax processed by beekeeper

Processed wax: Wax subjected to secondary processing into product (e.g. foundation sheets, candles)

Frozen: Minimum of -12^oC

Appendix 5. Options paper for South Island active surveillance    

Robert L. Sanson, Clifton B. King, Graham F. Mackereth

Introduction

The goals of the South Island (SI) surveillance plan are to:

1. Provide evidence of freedom from mite infection according to internationally agreed standards.

2. Provide sufficient detection power for a single cluster of infection, such that eradication could be attempted.

Method 1: Proof of Freedom Using Simple Random Sampling (SRS)

According to the International Committee of the OIE (1999), the proposed standard for bee disease freedom states that surveys should be designed to detect a prevalence not exceeding 0.2% with a 99% confidence.

Based on 9182 geo-coded apiaries in the South Island (as at 27 July 2000), the required number of sites to test to achieve this level of confidence using a simple random sample (SRS) would be 2071. This assumes that the 18 sites (0.2%) would be randomly distributed throughout the SI.

Method 2: Detection of a Single Cluster

Evidence from the North Island (NI) Varroa delimiting survey indicates that apiaries with mite infestation are distinctly clustered.

For the purposes of providing a "benchmark", a cluster is defined as a geographical unit of the approximate dimensions of the Hauraki cluster in the North Island. Hence a 20 x 20 km grid was used to represent this. The Hauraki cluster was examined and found to have a 48% intra-grid prevalence within a grid cell of these dimensions.

It is proffered that if a single such cluster existed within the South Island (SI), then eradication would potentially be achievable. However, to detect a single cluster, every geographic unit would need to be tested. Within each cluster unit, a random sample of apiaries would then be selected for testing. There are 319 grid cells that contain apiaries throughout the SI. The geographical distribution of these cells is shown in Figure 1.

The confidence of detection calculation is based on the hypergeometric distribution, which defines the probability of getting a particular outcome when sampling without replacement, given random distribution of infected and non-infected sites within a finite population. The specific calculation uses the probability of finding zero positives out of 1 to 7 randomly tested sites within each grid cell, if it was infected. This was done for each grid cell containing apiaries in the SI, using actual geographic data extracted from the Apiary database. The results were then summarised. The confidence was then taken to be 1 minus the probability of not finding any positives, i.e. the probability of finding at least one positive.

Figure 1. Distribution and density of South Island apiaries, based on 20x20 km grid cells.

A histogram of the number of apiaries per grid cell is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Distribution of number of apiaries per 20 x 20 km grid cell throughout the South Island.

Table 1 shows the confidence of detecting a cluster in a 20 x 20 km grid given various levels of random within grid-cell testing intensity and assuming various apparent intra-grid prevalences.

Table 1. Confidence of detecting a cluster in a 20 x 20 km grid with different levels of testing and different possible intra-grid prevalences.

Method 3: Risk-Based Purposive Sampling of Apiary Sites

It is reasonable to postulate that some areas of the SI are at higher risk of introduction of Varroa, and that there are certain "threats" that would increase the rate of spread within the SI. Further, if it were possible to identify these risks and threats, then it would be possible to design a purposive surveillance plan that targeted those sites.

Air and Sea ports

It is believed that air and sea ports are likely to be the primary portals of entry for Varroa into the SI. A list of container-handling sea ports was obtained from the New Zealand Maritime Authority. These are listed in Table 2 below.

Table 2. Container-handling sea ports in the South Island.

Port
Nelson
Picton
Lyttleton
Timaru
Dunedin
Bluff
Westport
Greymouth
Takaka

A list of airports in the South Island was compiled from commercial airline timetables and is shown in Table 3.

Table 3. Commercial airports in the South Island.

Airport
Nelson
Blenheim
Christchurch
Oamaru
Dunedin
Invercargill
Mt Cook
Tekapo (currently closed)
Twizel
Queenstown
Te Anau
Hokitika
Westport

Apiaries within 5 km of the above air and sea ports were identified using a geographic information system (GIS).

Large urban centres

Other risk sites are large urban centres due to the "importation" of cut flowers and fruits from the NI or overseas. Large urban centres (>= 100 ha in size) were extracted from the New Zealand Land Cover Database (LCDB). Sites within 2 km of these were identified.

Honey and wax collection / processing sites

Sites involved with honey, pollen and wax collection or processing were identified within a GIS. Apiaries within 5 km of these sites were selected.

Pollination areas

Horticultural areas visible on satellite imagery were identified off the LCDB. Apiaries within 2 km of these areas were located.

Large bee-keeping operations

Beekeepers with at least 100 sites were considered to represent a higher threat of spread, not least because they are also likely to be involved with pollination of orchards in the major fruit-growing areas of the SI. Fourteen beekeepers with a combined total of 1757 apiaries were classified as belonging to this threat category.

In total, 3157 apiaries were identified as being in the above risk and threat categories (see Figure 3). It would be required to test a random sample of 1691 of these to achieve a 99% confidence of detecting infection if it was present at a prevalence of 0.2%.

Figure 3. Apiaries classified as high risk of infection or constituting greater threat to spread.

Method 4: Risk-based purposive sampling of grid cells

If grid cells are also classified according to similar risk and threat criteria as those outlined above (see Method 3), then they too could be targeted in a purposive sampling manner. The specific risk criteria used included cells within 5 km of air and sea ports; cells within 2 km of major urban centres; cells within 2 km of significant horticultural areas; and cells within 5 km of honey and wax collection or processing houses. The grid cells identified are shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Grid cells classified as high risk of infection or of contributing greater threat to spread.

A total of 107 cells were identified, containing 5070 of the registered, geo-referenced sites in the SI. The numbers of sites to test are shown in Table 4.

Table 4. Numbers of sites to investigate for different testing levels, to achieve similar confidence levels to those shown in Table 1.

Other risk or threat categories considered but excluded from calculation were cells containing apiaries belonging to large bee-keeping operations; and cells along major transport routes. The reasons for exclusion are basically that most areas of the SI would have been included, therefore the outcome would have been no different from that presented in Method 2.

Method 5: Risk-based cluster detection plus SRS of remaining apiaries

A possible combination approach would be to test the major risk areas using a grid-based cluster detection approach (see Method 4), augmented by a SRS of remaining sites in the SI.

The numbers of sites to test would therefore include the 703 apiaries (at 7 sites per 20 km grid - see Method 4), plus a SRS of the 4112 remaining non-risk sites. The actual number to test for the latter scheme would depend on the chosen detection prevalence and the desired level of confidence. With a 0.2% prevalence, the numbers of sites to test for varying confidence levels are shown in Table 5.

Table 5. Number of sites to investigate (using a SRS) to detect a 0.2% prevalence of Varroa infection in the non-risk areas of the South Island at varying confidence levels.

If no evidence of infection was found during the testing of the high risk cells, then it is suggested that 90% confidence of freedom for the SRS part of the investigation would provide sufficient evidence of freedom. Hence the total number of apiaries to test would be 1731 (703 + 1028).

A variation of this theme, would be to do the grid-based cluster detection approach, augmented by a SRS of apiaries belonging to the14 large bee-keeping operations identified in Method 3 to ensure coverage of these enterprises and a SRS of apiaries of all of the remaining beekeepers.

Discussion

Currently, no evidence of infestation of Varroa in the South Island exists, although some high-risk traces to the SI were investigated subsequent to the mite being detected in the North Island in April 2000. These inspections proved to be negative. However, most observers believe there is now an increased risk of entry to the SI since the mite is fairly well established in the upper NI.

Movement control restrictions are currently in place to stop further movements of live bee and specified risk goods from the North to the South Island. In order to gain international recognition of zonal freedom of disease in the SI, it will be necessary to implement a surveillance plan that is well-founded on epidemiological principles and conforms to internationally agreed standards.

Five methods have been studied. Method 1 is based on a simple random sample (SRS) of all apiaries in the SI, to provide a 99% confidence of detecting infection if it exists at a prevalence at or above 0.2%. However, the method assumes that infestation would be randomly distributed throughout SI apiaries. Evidence to date from the infection in the NI clearly shows that infection is clustered. The principles on which the SRS method is based are violated in the presence of distinct clustering.

Method 2 uses the Hauraki, NI cluster as a benchmark, and is designed to detect a single such cluster anywhere in the SI. If 7 sites per cell are randomly selected and tested, then the method will have achieve a greater than 99% confidence of detecting a single cluster, and should also provide sufficient evidence of freedom if all site tests prove negative. Under this methodology, 1890 sites would need to be tested.

Ultimately, the ideals of science may be tempered by economic realities. If full geographic surveillance of the SI is judged to be too expensive, then a purposive sampling regime could be adopted. Major air and sea ports, large urban centres, and honey and wax processing houses are believed to be at higher risk of entry. Similarly, large bee-keeping operations and pollination areas could pose threats in terms of rate of spread within the SI. Hence, apiaries or cells that fell into some or all of these criteria were selected in Methods 3 - 5. Using a SRS technique (Method 3), 1691 sites of 3157 apiaries would need to be tested to achieve a 99% confidence of detecting infection if it was present at a prevalence of 0.2% in these areas. Using a risk-based cluster detection approach (Method 4), 703 sites scattered through 107 cells (7 per cell) would need to be tested. Using a combination approach (Method 5), the 107 high-risk cells would be tested (as per Method 3) plus 1028 additional sites randomly selected from the remaining areas, for a total of 1731 sites.

The question of what intra-site level testing of hives should be adopted has also been briefly considered. Essentially, to achieve a combined sensitivity of 99% of detecting Varroa mite using either an apiary testing or cluster detection approach, 99.5% sensitivity at the hive level, plus 99.5% at the apiary or grid level would be required. Given that the hive level infection within an apiary could be low (10-30%), virtually every hive would need to be tested.

It must be realized that a single negative testing round using one of the five proposed methods would only provide temporary evidence of freedom from infection. Given that infection is now endemic in the NI, an on-going surveillance plan would be required. This would either require annual testing using one of the above methods, or could be based on a single negative testing round now, plus the installation of sentinel hives in the high-risk areas.

References

Office International des Epizooties (1999). Appendix XXIII on Bee Diseases. Addendum to the report of the Meeting of the OIE International Animal Health Code Commission. Paris, 18-22 January 1999.

Appendix 6. Draft terms of reference for an analysis of the risks to non-target species associated with a feral bee poisoning programme    

Yet to be developed

Appendix 7. Draft terms of reference for an assessment of the risk to public health associated with a feral bee poisoning programme.    

Yet to be developed.

Appendix 8. Draft terms of reference for an analysis of the risks of varroa introduction into the South Island    

Yet to be developed.

Appendix 9. Draft terms of reference for development and approval of a standardised delivery method for formic acid solutions for the treatment of varroa    

Yet to be developed.

Appendix 10. Funding arrangements for treatments    

Purpose

1. This paper considers the advantages and disadvantages of the Government subsidising the cost of varroa treatments in the North Island during the next two-years.

Background

2. On 12 July 2000, the Cabinet, among other things, agreed in principle to a two year Government supported interim management programme for varroa mite. The programme objectives are to ensure the South Island remains varroa free for as long as possible, and that impacts in the North Island are mitigated.

3. The Cabinet directed MAF to finalise an operational plan in consultation with industry, and report back with a:

(i) recommended programme;

(ii) cost benefit analysis;

(iii) proposed implementation plan [CAB POL (00) M 17/1 refers].

4. There is general agreement within Government that the Crown will provide financial assistance to the North Island beekeeping industry for a period of two years while long-term varroa management solutions are developed. The level of assistance, and where it will be targeted, has yet to be finalised.

5. The cost per hive of treatment products is estimated at $25 per annum. The total treatment cost per hive, taking into account labour and travel costs, has been variously estimated at between $40 and $55 per annum. The National Beekeepers' Association (NBA) has indicated it favours beekeepers deciding when and how to treat, as well as applying treatments, during the interim two-year programme. The NBA has also indicated, however, that it favours the Government paying the full cost of treatment products during this period. This would represent a Government subsidy on total treatment costs of between 45 and 60 percent.

Comment

6. Effective long-term management of Varroa would involve a programme of integrated pest management, funded in a sustainable manner. The advantages and disadvantages of Government-subsidised treatments during the interim two-year programme should be assessed according to whether the subsidy would positively facilitate a transition to desired long-term arrangements.

Advantages of a Government subsidy

7. The advantages of Government subsidising the cost of treatments are that it:

• provides support to affected beekeepers while sustainable funding arrangements are developed;
• provides an incentive for beekeepers to correctly use approved products;
• maximises the likelihood of slowing varroa's spread.

Sustainable funding arrangements

8. Varroa has impacts well beyond the beekeeping industry. It is reasonable to expect that the horticulture, pastoral and arable industries will contribute toward the cost of varroa management. The provision of a Government subsidy for a two-year period would provide breathing space for industries to negotiate and agree new market arrangements.

9. However, affected beekeepers already have relationships with the industries reliant on bees for crop pollination. A commercial market is particularly well developed for pollination services in the horticulture and arable sectors. It should be possible for beekeepers to re-define their relationships over the medium term to account for the additional costs of varroa management.

Correct use of approved products

10. It is critical to long-term management of varroa in New Zealand that beekeepers understand and adopt the principles of integrated pest management. An important component of this will be the correct use of approved treatment products. The provision of Government-subsidised treatment products for a two-year period would provide incentives for beekeepers to use approved treatments in the prescribed manner. The subsidy would therefore have a positive extension benefit.

Slowing the spread

11. There are undoubted benefits to all affected industries if the spread of varroa throughout the North Island can be slowed. Beekeeping activity is the prime means through which varroa will spread, and it is important that affected beekeepers keep mite levels in their hives low.

12. The management of varroa will be most effective if approved products are used. The provision of Government-subsidised treatment products for a two-year period would maximise the uptake of approved treatments, and potentially delay the spread of varroa to areas not currently infested.

Disadvantages of a Government subsidy

13. The disadvantages of Government subsidising the cost of treatments are it:

• potentially creates expectations of on-going government support;
• raises potential equity issues;
• could lead to industry stockpiling of subsidised products;
• has a cost to the Crown.

Expectations of ongoing Government support

14. The provision of a Government subsidy for treatment products may create disincentives for industries to agree sustainable long-term funding arrangements. Industries may consider that in the absence of long-term arrangements, pressure could be placed on the Government to continue its subsidy indefinitely.

Equity issues

15. If the Government were to subsidise the cost of varroa treatment products, a number of equity issues would arise:

• the Government must be consistent in its support for agricultural industries. If it subsidises the cost of varroa management, it may be called upon to subsidise the cost of managing problems in other industries;
• beekeepers outside of the currently infected zone may consider it inequitable if the Government provides a treatment subsidy to currently affected beekeepers, but not to them as varroa spreads;
• beekeepers that intend to manage varroa through 'biotechnical' means (using hive manipulation rather than chemical products) would be disadvantaged.

Industry stockpiling

16. If the Government were to pay the cost of treatment products during the interim two-year programme, there would be considerable incentives for affected beekeepers to stockpile products for use in later years. A requirement that beekeepers pay the initial cost of treatments themselves, and apply for a rebate, would provide the Government with an opportunity to assess each claim for reasonableness. Measures against which to assess claims would be required. Options involve rebating only for sites in an infested area, or only upon the return of used strips. Both of these options are problematic, and stockpiling must be noted as a significant risk to a Government subsidy.

Cost to the Crown

17. The fiscal cost of the Government paying the full cost of treatment products during the two-year interim programme is estimated at about $900,000. There would also be additional costs of administering the scheme. In terms of the total two-year support package, MAF considers that subsidised treatments are the lowest priority for Government expenditure. The Minister for Agriculture has indicated that he does not support the Government subsidising treatments, preferring instead to devote available resources to such things as surveillance, movement controls, extension, and South Island incursion response.

Summary

18. The Government has indicated it wishes to support varroa affected industries through a period of transition. A two-year support package is being proposed, targeted primarily at surveillance, movement controls, extension, and South Island incursion response.

19. Expenditure on each component of the package must be prioritised against other components. Although the provision of subsidised treatments would have some advantages, MAF considers that other components of the programme are a higher priority for available resources. There are also some disadvantages to a subsidy. In particular it would create a number of equity issues, and provide disincentives for industries to move toward long-term sustainable funding arrangements. The Minister for Agriculture agrees with MAF's analysis.

Conclusion

20. No Government subsidy will be provided for the cost of varroa treatments as part of the two year Government supported management programme.

Appendix 11. Terms of reference for a varroa control booklet contract    

1 Objective

To provide all registered beekeepers with an updateable resource to be used to increase understanding of:

• varroa biology
• varroa epidemiology
• technical aspects of control of varroa, and
• legal and regulatory aspects of control of varroa in New Zealand

2 Background

The Technical Advisory Group identified a beekeeper extension service as a key component of a varroa management plan at the first meeting on 2 May 2000. In developing ideas for such a service, the AgriQuality draft Operational plan for control of varroa mooted the concept of a varroa control booklet to be distributed to all beekeepers prior to the 2000-01 beekeeping season. Although there has as yet been no specific financial appropriation for the project, MAF has decided that the urgency of the project dictates that preparation of the booklet should begin immediately.

3 Specifications

3.1 Scope

The scope of the project involves:

• developing booklet contents
• printing specified number of booklets
• distributing to all registered beekeepers.

3.2 Process

a) Led by Contractor, under specific contract to MAF Biosecurity Authority.

b) Responsibility for development of specific sections may be delegated to sub-contractors, with agreement of MAF.

c) Terms of reference developed by MAF in consultation with identified potential contractors (HortResearch and AgriQuality) and National Beekeepers Association.

d) Tenders (project plan, timeframe, costs) developed by potential Contractors and submitted to MAF.

e) MAF and NBA evaluate tenders and agree on Contractor.

f) Contract developed and signed.

g) Regular (suggest weekly) progress reports.

h) Final sign-off of format and content by MAF in consultation with NBA.

i) Printing arranged by Contractor.

j) Distribution to all registered beekeepers arranged by Contractor.

3.3 Format

a) Updateable to allow revisions and additions, either by distributing inserts or by printing revised editions.

b) Project a professional image for MAF, Contractor and NBA

c) Low cost

d) Information provided as text, diagrams, graphs and photos in colour format.

3.4 Content

a) History of Varroa:

- A very brief history of Varroa, where it came from and how it spread around the world + when it came into NZ

b) Biology:

- Description of the biology of Varroa.

- How Varroa spreads between colonies

- How fast populations grow

- Role of populations in surrounding hives on population dynamics within a hive

- Acute and chronic phases

c) Effect on beehives:

- Effects on individual bees

- Effects on colonies

- Post-mite syndrome (viruses)

- Effect on production

- Effect on pollination

d) Diagnosis and evaluation of infestations

- ether roll

- sugar shake

- scratching drone brood

- screen boards

- Apistan as a surveillance tool

- How to make sticky boards

e) Control Methods

- Chemical controls

- synthetics

- plant-derived materials

- Biotechnical controls

- Breeding for resistance

- Resistance

- Residues

f) Integrated pest management

- Why integrated control

- Economic thresholds

- Monitoring

g) Co-ordinated Varroa control

- Why

- How to organise it

h) Examples of control programmes used by overseas beekeepers

i) Recommended control programmes for New Zealand beekeepers

j) Regulatory and legal issues related to treatment

k) Regulatory and legal issues relating to movements controls

l) Research

- setting priorities and managing research

- approval, monitoring and reporting research projects

- update on research projects underway and completed

l) A list of contacts and useful addresses

4 Tender process

a) Terms of reference provided to potential contractors (by 31 August 2000)

b) Tenders received at MAF (by close of business Friday 8 September 2000)

c) Decision on successful bid and agreement to proceed in lieu of contract (Monday 11 September 2000)

d) Contract developed based upon successful tender (asap following decision on successful bid).

Appendix 12. Draft terms of reference for the delivery of a programme of beekeeper workshops to develop skills for varroa management    

Yet to be developed.

Appendix 13. Terms of reference for the Varroa Management Group     

Yet to be developed.